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Abstract—Supporting error resilience in future exascale-class
supercomputing systems is a critical challenge. Due to transistor
scaling trends and increasing memory density, scientific simula-
tions are expected to experience more interruptions caused by
transient errors in the system memory. Existing hardware-based
detection and recovery techniques will be inadequate to manage
the presence of high memory fault rates.
In this paper we propose a partial memory protection scheme
based on region-based memory management. We define the
concept of regions called havens that provide fault protection for
program objects. We provide reliability for the regions through
a software-based parity protection mechanism. Our approach
enables critical program objects to be placed in these havens. The
fault coverage provided by our approach is application agnostic,
unlike algorithm-based fault tolerance techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
The management of faults and errors is a critical concern for
the next generation of high-performance computing systems.
With transistor scaling, the computing devices fabricated us-
ing miniaturized device feature sizes face serious reliability
threats. The presence of frequent faults in the hardware,
and the resulting errors, will have catastrophic effects on
the scientific applications. The applications may not be able
to run to completion, or may complete with wrong results
due to undetected errors. Therefore, effective fault resilience
techniques will be critical for the productive and efficient use
of future exascale-class HPC systems [1].
Soft errors in memory are expected to increase dramatically
due to increased memory densities in modern HPC systems.
Traditionally, reliable memory systems have been equipped
with hardware-based ECC, which is capable of correcting
single bit errors and detecting double bit errors (SECDED)
[2]. However scaling trends, which shrink transistor sizes
and reduce supply voltage, result in reduction of charge
This work was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of
Advanced Scientific Computing Research. This manuscript has been authored
by UT-Battelle, LLC under Contract No. DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the
U.S. Department of Energy. The United States Government retains and
the publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that
the United States Government retains a non-exclusive, paid-up, irrevocable,
world-wide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this
manuscript, or allow others to do so, for United States Government purposes.
The Department of Energy will provide public access to these results of
federally sponsored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access Plan
(http://energy.gov/downloads/doe-public-access-plan).
stored per device, and a correspondingly higher exposure to
soft error events. Furthermore, exascale systems are expected
to embrace more complex and denser memory hierarchies,
and utilize more diverse memory technologies in pursuit of
higher memory capacity, and better energy efficiency and
performance [3]. Therefore, existing hardware-based detection
and correction techniques will be insufficient to cope with all
memory errors. Silent data corruptions (SDC) are particularly
problematic because they cause incorrect data to be delivered
to applications without an error notification being raised.
From the perspective of an HPC application, there is an
expectation of reliable program execution regardless of how
unreliable a system is. However, for various scientific appli-
cations, not every computation needs to be performed reliably
as long as specific critical computations and their input and
result data are guaranteed to be highly reliable. Different
variables in a program may exhibit different vulnerabilities
to transient faults. Many classes of scientific algorithms are
able to leverage such an expectation of selective robustness to
continue to make progress towards an acceptable outcome in
the presence of some system unreliability [4]. In this paper,
we explore the use of selective reliability through a region-
based approach to memory allocation. This approach enables
the creation of software-enabled robust memory regions called
havens. We guarantee highly-reliable behavior for these re-
gions through comprehensive error protection based on a
lightweight software-based parity protection scheme. Havens
permit grouping program objects with similar robustness re-
quirements. Based on this model for memory management,
the HPC applications may develop resiliency strategies that
trade-off application performance with reliability under pro-
gram control, by declaring certain program data objects and
computations to be highly reliable. Using accelerated fault-
injection experiments, we measure the fault coverage of our
approach, which confirms that havens provide high levels
of fault protection for critical program objects with limited
overhead to the overall application performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
motivates the concept and describes its important features.
Section III describes abstract haven interfaces, while Section
IV describes our prototype implementation of the interfaces
and the parity-based protection algorithm. Section V presents
the experimental evaluation and results.
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Fig. 1. Havens-based Memory Management
II. RESILIENCE-DRIVEN MEMORY MANAGEMENT
In the region-based memory management scheme for typed,
high-level programming languages, the runtime memory is
partitioned into regions and the assignment of program ob-
jects to regions is statically decided by the compiler. The
memory allocation and deallocation is statically specified in
the program at compile time and the program is annotated
to include operations for managing regions [5]. The approach
was proposed as an alternative to garbage collection in the
context of declarative programming languages. The scheme
was improved by relaxing the requirement for region lifetimes
to be lexical [6]. However, the efficacy of using static memory
management decisions in place of runtime garbage collection
has been widely debated.
We propose an adaptation of the region-based memory
management concept in which our primary aim is to pro-
vide error resilient memory regions for HPC applications.
Based on the insight that HPC applications dominantly use
imperative programming paradigms, rather than declarative
programming, we do not limit the concept of havens to any
specific language style. Our proposed approach retains the core
concept of well-defined regions for program objects. However,
rather than assigning objects to regions solely based on their
lexical scopes, we relax several constraints of the original
concept and define features that make havens more suitable
to HPC applications and programming paradigms and provide
reliability. The salient features of our resilience-driven, region-
based memory management scheme are:
• Havens provide robust containers in which program ob-
jects may be allocated. The memory region is protected
by a predefined error detection and/or correction scheme
that is agnostic to the algorithm features or structure of
the data objects placed in havens.
• The havens enable separation between the memory allo-
cation and the implementation of the robustness scheme.
In theory, a region can be made robust using various
protection mechanisms, e.g., replication, parity, hashing,
etc. As illustrated in Figure 1 various regions in the
program memory may be offered coverage using separate
protection schemes. Since each of these methods carry a
different level of overhead, for an application this enables
the creation of logical grouping of objects that require
similar robustness characteristics.
• Havens enable applications to exert fine-grained control
on the resilience properties of individual program objects.
Since different havens may have varying guarantees of
reliability, based on the strength of the protection mech-
Fig. 2. Havens Interfaces
anism and its performance overhead, object placement in
havens may be driven by the trade-off between criticality
of the object to program correctness and the associated
overhead.
• The objects in a haven are all freed at once by deleting
the entire pool of memory. Therefore, havens enable the
association of lifetime to the robust memory regions.
The key advantage of havens-based memory management is
that it makes it straightforward for HPC applications to reason
about the reliability requirements of programs and specific
program fragments.
III. USING HAVENS IN HPC APPLICATIONS
In this section we introduce the abstract interface between
the runtime memory manager and the application program.
The overall goal of the havens approach is to enable applica-
tions to allocate program objects into regions for which there is
a well-defined robustness scheme. Each program object that
is resident to a region is provided with error protection. In
imperative languages such as C/C++, the memory allocation
interface consists of two operations: an alloc and free which
create new heap objects. In our scheme, the application
program interacts with a haven manager, which implements
the haven abstraction and its error protection mechanism and
handles the subdivision of the heap memory.
A. Creation
The havens are part of the heap where memory is allocated.
When the region is first created, no memory is allocated.
The creation is requested by an application using an abstract
interface to the haven manager. When the application requests
the creation of a new region, the haven manager returns
a handle to the memory region, which is to be used in
subsequent operations. The abstract interface needs to provide
a __haven_create__ primitive for haven creation. Also,
the robustness technique may be explicitly specified for the
memory region. Upon creation, the haven is an abstract entity
for which an application expresses an expectation of reliability.
B. Allocation
An application requests allocation of memory within a re-
gion using the handle to the haven. This entails allocation of a
block consisting of a specified amount of memory. The abstract
interface must provide an interface __haven_alloc__, to
which the application specifies a handle to the haven of which
the new memory block will be a part of. The haven manager
maintains state for the robustness feature of the memory region
and the allocation requests initialization of such state.
C. Deallocation
When the haven is destroyed, all memory blocks allocated
in the region are deallocated and the memory is available for
reuse. Since this is the only way to deallocate memory in
the region model, no further memory allocation requests are
valid. Therefore, all the program objects located in a particular
region are all simultaneously deallocated. The robustness
characteristic of the haven and the state maintained by the
haven manager is also destroyed. The abstract interface must
provide a __haven_destroy__ primitive, which uses the
haven handle.
D. Read/Write
The havens interface must provide __haven_read__ and
__haven_write__ primitives. The read primitive implic-
itly detects whether the object is in error state, whenever the
object is referenced. The write primitive updates any state
maintained by the haven’s resilience mechanism, in addition
updating the object itself.
E. Relaxation
Among the key features of the havens-based memory man-
agement is the association of reliability lifetime with the
memory contained in the haven. Many HPC applications can
naturally divide their work into nearly independent pieces or
phases for which the reliability requirement may be more or
less stringent. The error protection scheme may be turned on
and off based on the needs of the application program. The ab-
stract interface must provide primitives __haven_relax__
and __haven_robust__ in order to relax and impose the
protection scheme on the memory region.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The description of the haven interfaces in the previous
section is intentionally abstract and language-independent, and
a variety of implementations for these interfaces are possible.
To simplify porting existing HPC applications to use havens,
our initial prototype implementation provides a minimal set
of haven library interface calls, which will require limited
changes to application source codes.
A. Basic Haven Operations
The heap is divided into fixed-size pages, and each new
haven creation is aligned on a page-size boundary. The haven
manager maintains a linked list of these pages. The library
provides concrete functions for each of the primitives that
enable basic haven operations. The library provides a haven-
type that is used to create handle objects, and which contains
the bounds of page addresses that make up the memory region.
An identifier is bound to a haven handle and the handle to the
haven is passed as argument to the allocation and destruction
functions. The functions __hmalloc() and __hnew() im-
plement the abstraction __haven_create() for the alloca-
tion of objects into the associated region. The implementation
of the haven system imposes no changes on the representation
of pointers and permits the access to individual objects in the
havens using pointer operations. However, we only support
per-region allocation and deallocation and therefore per-object
deallocation is an illegal operation. The __hdestroy()
operation concatenates all the haven’s page list to a global
list of free pages. The present implementation does not
support techniques that prevent dangling-pointer dereferences
and require the programmer to ensure safety when haven
deallocation function is called.
B. Parity-based Protection
Fig. 3. Parity-based Protection for Haven Memory
The goal of the error protection mechanism is to pro-
vide comprehensive fault coverage for the memory of an
entire haven. In order to implement a generic scheme that
is agnostic to the actual program data structure, yet car-
ries low performance overhead, we employ a parity-based
detection/correction mechanism. The region is the unit of
memory over which the library applies the parity-based de-
tection/correction.
The Figure 3 illustrates the implementation of the parity-
based detection/correction scheme applied to the haven. The
implementation is based on the bit-level representation of the
memory in the haven and is independent of the higher-level
data type. The haven manager maintains a pair of correction
signatures for each memory region, which are of word length,
and an additional word length detection signature per 64
words in the memory block in the region. The detection
signature contains one parity bit per word in the memory
region. As memory is allocated for the region and initialized,
the correction signature S1 retains the XOR of all words that
are written to the memory region. We apply an XOR operation
on every word that is updated in the memory region and the
correction signature S2. Silent data corruptions or multi-bit
errors are detected based on the state of the detection signature
containing a parity bit for each word contained in the memory
region.
When the parity signature for a memory location in the
haven detects a parity violation, the location of the corrupted
memory word may be identified. The value at the corrupted
memory location may be recovered using the XOR signature
words. The XOR of the two signatures S1 and S2 equals the
XOR of all the uncorrupted locations in the haven. The cor-
rupted value in the memory region is recovered by performing
an XOR operation on the remaining words in the haven with
the XOR of the two signatures S1 and S2. The recovered
value overwrites the corrupted value, and the detection sig-
nature is recomputed. Using this correction scheme, multibit
corruptions may be recovered from (unlike hardware ECC,
which only offers single-bit error correction and double-bit
error detection). Each of these of detection/recovery operations
are transparent to the application. This parity-based protection
is an adaptation of an erasure code and it maintains very
limited state for the detection and correction capabilities and
therefore carries very little space overhead in comparison to
other software-based schemes such as software-based ECC and
checksums schemes. The detection is a constant time operation
while the recovery is a O(n) operation based on the size of
the haven.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Methodology
The fault model for these experiments is transient errors,
particularly silent data corruptions. Therefore, we have de-
signed an accelerated fault injection system in which we inject
multiple random faults into the address space of a program
under execution. We perturb multiple bits of the selected
injection site and no error notification is raised. The fault
location and distribution of fault intervals is randomized, and
applications experience at least 5 faults per application run.
For the evaluation of the haven-based memory management
system, we modify a conjugate gradient code to include the
havens library API calls. We use a pre-conditioned iterative
CG algorithm, and we validate the outcome of the solver
with a solution produced using a direct solver. In the CG
algorithm, which solves a system of linear equations A.x =
b, the application allocates the matrix A, the vector b and the
solution vector x. Additionally, the conjugate vectors p and
the residual vector r are referenced during each iteration of
the algorithm. We perform two sets of experiments, in both of
which the various objects in the CG code are allocated using
havens. In the first experiment, we evaluate the CG application
under accelerated fault injections. For each experiment run,
we allocate only one structure using the haven, while the
remaining structures are allocated using the standard memory
allocation interfaces.
From an error recovery perspective, the application state
may be classified into three types of state: the static state,
which represents variables initialized at the start and remain
unmodified during the computation; the dynamic state, which
represents the solution data structures that are continuously up-
dated; and, the computational environment, which represents
the program code, environment variable, pointer variables, etc.
In the second set of experiments, this classification forms the
basis of selecting which data structures in the CG code are
allocated into havens. We evaluate the following combinations
of CG objects’ placements: (i) allocation of only the static
state, i.e., the matrix A and vector B, the preconditioner M into
havens, while the dynamic state, i.e., all the solution vectors,
are allocated using standard memory allocation functions; (ii)
allocation of only matrix A and vector B into havens; (iii) only
the dynamic state is provided fault coverage using havens.
B. Results
Providing fault coverage to all the CG’s variables results in
a success rate in the excess of 90% for the accelerated fault
injection experiments, as shown in Figure 4(a). The operand
matrix A occupies a dominant part of the solver’s memory,
occupying over 50% of the active address space, whereas the
solution vector x, the conjugate vectors p and the residual
vector r and the preconditioner matrix M account for the
remaining space. The preconditioner matrix M demonstrates
lower sensitivity to the silent errors, as do the vectors x,
p, r. This is because silent errors in the operand matrix A
or vector b fundamentally changes the linear system being
solved. Even if the CG solver converges to a solution, it may
be significantly different from a correct solution. The alloca-
tion of these structures into havens provides a substantially
higher resilient behavior in terms of completion rates of the
CG algorithm. The algorithm is naturally resilient to silent
corruptions in the solution vectors, and the results suggest that
there is little incentive to allocate these vectors into havens.
The preconditioning matrix is also tolerant to errors, but may
sometimes require a substantially higher number of iterations
to converge to a solution. The performance overhead of using
havens to the convergence time of the CG code (Figure 5(b)) is
Fig. 4. Impact of havens’ fault coverage on application outcomes
Fig. 5. Performance overheads of havens
higher for higher coverage, but correlating the coverage results
demonstrates that higher coverage for low sensitivity program
state does not translate to higher application resilience.
The results of the evaluation of the strategic allocation
of program objects using havens (Figure 4(b)), and their
correlation with the performance overhead analysis (Figure
5(b)), shows that the allocation of only the matrix A and vector
B yields the best return in terms of completion success rate
of the application. The remaining combinations of allocation
using havens provides diminishing returns. The results indicate
that the CG solver suits the model of selective reliability, in
which the various program objects show different sensitivities
to errors and impact on the outcome of the application. The
results indicate that placing only such critical objects in the
parity-protected havens yields higher probability of successful
outcome and we are able to avoid additional overhead to
performance incurred in protecting lesser important program
objects.
VI. RELATED WORK
Reliable memory systems have been implemented using
hardware-based encoding techniques such as ECC [2] [7].
Memory scrubbing techniques were proposed in order to
increase memory reliability in noisy environments [8], which
entail periodically reading all memory lines, correcting any
bits through ECC, and writing corrected data back to the
same location. The use of additional encoding bits for stronger
error detection and correction codes adds overheads to the
area, energy consumption, and increases the memory access
latencies. Other approaches have focused on designing fault
tolerant memory cells through cell-hardening techniques [9]
[10]. The partial protection of cache memory has been ac-
complished by partitioning sensitive and non-sensitive data
[11], and through dynamic assignment of protection priority
to error-prone cache lines [12]. Partial protection was also
explored through a reliability-aware data placement scheme
that provided stronger fault protection for only the program
code and data sections [13].
Software-based selective protection may be accomplished
through compiler-directed techniques, in which all statements
relevant to the computation of specific variables are ex-
tracted using static program analysis, and placed in protection
domains [14]. Programming constructs called containment
domains [15] offer transactional semantics for programmer-
defined computational scope, where as Rolex [16] offers
langauge-based extensions that support various resilience se-
mantics on application data and computations. Global View
Resilience (GVR) supports reliability of application data by
providing an interface for applications to maintain version-
based snapshots of the data [17]. In support of fault tolerance
of dynamic memory allocation, the malloc_failable may
be used by the application to allocate memory on the heap;
callback functions are used to handle error recovery of the
memory block [18]. Much research has also been done on
algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) methods [19] [20].
These approaches apply encoding on the application data
structures to detect and recover errors in them. However, such
approaches require significant modifications to the application
source code to incorporate the fault detection and correction
capabilities into the algorithm. The notion of selective re-
liability was demonstrated as a viable solution for iterative
methods for linear solvers, in which the GMRES algorithm is
partitioned into reliable and unreliable phases [21].
VII. CONCLUSION
Future HPC systems may not be able to offer complete
hardware-based protection mechanisms for memory errors due
to constraints of cost and energy. Due to their frequency,
which is only expected to increase in future systems, it is
imperative to protect critical program objects from errors that
are uncorrectable by hardware schemes, and from silent data
corruptions. In this paper we presented a software-driven fault
tolerance technique for program memory, which extends the
concept of region-based memory management. HPC applica-
tions may identify the most critical memory objects and place
them in robust regions, called havens. The havens are protected
using a software-implemented, lightweight parity-based error
detection and correction scheme, which provides transparent
protection against memory errors without relying on any
hardware-based detection/correction schemes. Our solution is
agnostic to the algorithm design, and is applicable to a variety
of HPC applications that require selective reliability. Our
results show that providing such explicitly robust memory
havens proves to be an effective way of providing low-cost
fault tolerance for applications running on unreliable system
fabrics.
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